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THE UNRULY HORSE 
REFLECTIONS ON THE RULE OF LAW
“The truth is  that the rule of 
law is apt to be an unruly horse 
. . .  If ana lysis is  attempted it is  
found that the idea includes no­
tions which are essen tia lly  
im precise.”
(Sir Ivor Jennings: The law  
and the constitu tion  60)
Critics often say that certain aspects of South African  
law or of the South African societal structure constitute 
infringem ents of the rule of law. One is left by these 
critics with a general notion that the rule of law  is some 
sort of Sollensprin zip  applying to positive law, i e a cri­
terion for the evaluation of legal rules and system s, and 
that m ainly those m easures which are being em ployed in 
South Africa to substantiate the policy of separate deve­
lopment in the field of race relations and m ost of the pro­
v ision s for safeguarding state security are in conflict 
with its principles. As such th is m ystica l concept is  
being used to bring the basic structure of the South Afri­
can way of liv in g  into disrepute; and the urgency of the 
situation necessitates all who are com pelled to plan their 
future in our sub-continent to take careful note of its  exact 
m eaning, function and contents. A philosophical survey  
of contemporary society within the context of the South 
African situation w ill therefore be incom plete if it were to 
om it an an alysis of the rule of law.
The m ysteries of the rule of law have intrigued law yers 
and philosophers for alm ost a hundred years. Their ob­
servations led Sir Ivor Jennings to compare the rule of 
law with an unruly horse. The truth is, however, that the 
rule of law resem bles a cham eleon rather than a horse. 
For if analysis is  attempted it w ill be found that the idea 
takes on different shades of m eaning to satisfy  the subjec­
tive prejudices of its interpreters or to cope with a variety  
of quite irreconcilable situations. N eedless to say, such
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fluc tu a tio n s  of m ean ing  are  de trim en ta l to the v e ry  idea 
and  true  re levancy  of a b asic  ru le  (or b asic  ru les) of law.
In the p resen t context I p la n  to add m y ow n o b serv a tio n s  
reg a rd in g  the ru le  of law  to the  m an y  o ther a ttem pts 
w hich  have been m ade to b rid le  the u n ru ly  horse. In doing 
so I w ill b ear in  m ind the  re lev an cy  w hich  such  aco n cep t 
m ay  have in  view  of the South  A frican  soc ie ta l structu re . 
A nd in  d ea ling  w ith  o ther ex p o sitio n s  of the  ru le  of law , I 
can  unders tan d ab ly  o n ly  re fe r to a  few of the m ost im p o r­
ta n t in te rp re ta tio n s .
DICEY AND THE RULE OF LAW
The te rm  “ru le  of law ” w as in troduced  and  o rig in a lly  
defined by A V Dicey d u rin g  the second h a lf  of the la s t 
cen tu ry  to denote the fundam en ta l p rin c ip le s  of B ritish  
co n stitu tio n a l law; and, as  po in ted  out b y D C M  Y ardley, 
“. . .  any  m odem  d iscu ssio n  of th e  sub ject m u s t begin  w ith  
th e  theo ry  of P ro fesso r A V D ic ey  . . . , ” ‘) because, 
a lth o u g h  the m ean in g  of “ru le  of law ” h a s  undergone 
m any  changes since  Dicey, “. . .  the in fluence of D icey 
rem a in s  a  rea l force.”2)
D icey understood  the ru le  of law  to m ean  the  “sup rem acy  
of law .”3) This idea, w hich im p lie s  b as ica lly  th a t both the 
su b o rd in a tes  and the  govern m en t of a  s ta te  are  sub ject to 
the  law , inc ludes th ree  p rin c ip les : firs tly , th a t tra n s g re s ­
s io n s  of the law  are  to be e s tab lish ed  in  accordance w ith  
the  law  in  the o rd in a ry  leg a l m an n er and before th e  reg u ­
la r  cou rts  and th a t p e rso n s  in  a u th o rity  a re  therefore not 
to  be endow ed w ith  a rb itra ry , p re ro g a tiv e  o r d isc re tio n ­
a ry  pow ers; secondly, th a t no  p erson  is  to  be above the 
law  and th a t a ll p e rso n s  a re  th e re fo re  en titled  to be 
trea ted  as equals  before the law; and th ird ly , th a t co n s ti­
tu tio n a l r ig h ts  of the sub jec ts  are  to be determ ined  in  the 
o rd in a ry  course  of ju s tic e  and  th a t no sp ec ia l s ig n if i­
cance is  to be attached  to co n s titu tio n a l law .4)
The w hole trend  of D icey’s ex p o sitio n  of the ru le  of law  
m ade it q u ite  c lea r th a t he w as on ly  concerned  w ith  basic  
p rin c ip le s  of spec ifica lly  E n g lish  law. In its  o rig in a l 
form  the ru le  of law  w as n ev er in tended to reflect the 
m ean ing -kernel o r e sse n tia l c h a ra c te r is tic s  of the law  as 
such; no r w as it m ean t to p o r tra y  idea l p rin c ip le s  of w hat 
the law  in g en era l ou g h t to be. A lthough  D icey h im se lf
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obviously  p referred  the ty p ica l B ritish  p rin c ip le s  of the 
ru le  of law  to the co rrespond ing  co n stitu tio n a l ru le s  ol 
ce rta in  o ther system s, he never p ro fessed  those  p r in ­
cip les to be an y th in g  but 19th cen tu ry  em p irica l ru le s  of 
the E n g lish  law.
This m u st be borne in  m ind w hen one ju d g es  D icey’s 
critics . The c ritic ism  of Hood P h illip s , th a t the  ru le  of law  
as expounded by Dicey did not coincide w ith  the  B ritish  
concept of p a rliam e n ta ry  suprem acy , is  for th a t reason  
u n ju stifiab le .5) T his c ritiq u e  p resu p p o ses  th a t the ru le  of 
law  w as m ean t to operate  as  a fundam ental p rin c ip le  of 
a ll law  or of a ll E n g lish  law , because on ly  in  th a t sense 
can  it be sa id  to co n trad ic t the idea th a t p a rlia m e n t can  
abo lish  o r am end all law s (including  th e  p rin c ip le s  of the 
ru le  of law ) by reason  of its  sov ere ig n  su p rem acy .8) Hood 
P h illip s ’ d escrip tion  of the ru le  of law  a s  “a  ru le  of po li­
t ic s ”7) w as also  beside the m ark , because, as w as poin ted  
out above, Dicey did not in tend  the ru le  of law  to ind icate  
the lega l idea, i e an  ag g reg a te  of p rin c ip les  of w h at the 
law  ough t to be. The sam e ap p lie s  to  V erloren  v an  The- 
m aa t’s sup p o sitio n  th a t the ru le  of law  co m p rises  “sta te  
m orality , o r ru les  of decency in  p o litic s” , and tha t, as 
such, it m u st no t be seen as a ju r is tic  concept.8) In p a ss in g  
it should  a lso  be noted th a t V erloren  v an  T hem aat o p er­
a tes w ith  a narrow  p o sitiv ism  w hich su p p o ses  th a t the 
legal idea, no t being  p o sitive  law, fa lls  ou tside the rea lm  
of the ju r is tic  sphere  of rea lity .
Im m anen t c ritiq u e  of D icey’s doctrine  of the  ru le  of law  
ough t to be based on D icey’s own concept of th e  ru le  of 
law. The in q u iry  shou ld  therefore s im p ly  be w h eth er the 
p rin c ip le s  of the ru le  of law, as sta ted  by Dicey, w ere in  
fact reflected  in  the E n g lish  co n stitu tio n a l law  of h is  
tim e. A dhering  to th is  basic  ru le  of im m an en t critique, 
Wade and P h illip s  po in ted  ou t conv incing ly  th a t th is  w as 
not the case .9) To m ention  on ly  a few exam ples: D icey’s 
f irs t p rinc ip le , i e the one contra  a rb itra ry  pow ers, did not 
allow  for the delegated law -m ak ing  com petencies and 
d isc re tio n a ry  pow ers of m em bers of the executive; the 
second p rinc ip le , w hich  in genera l affirm ed the sub jec­
tion  of s ta te  officials to the “o rd in a ry ” law s and  the  ju r i s ­
dic tion  of re g u la r  courts, lo s t s ig h t of the p riv ileg es  and 
im m u n ities  of certa in  pub lic  officials, d ip lo m ats  and 
o ther p erso n s  in au th o rity  and w as not borne ou t by the 
sy stem  of ad m in is tra tiv e  jud ica tu re ; and  the th ird  p r in ­
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ciple, accord ing  to w hich  the r ig h ts  of the sub jects  w ere 
supposed  no t to be derived  from  co n stitu tio n a l law , w as 
contradicted  by the s ta tu to ry  g ra n tin g  of ce rta in  rig h ts  
and freedom s.
RESTATEMENT OF THE RULE OF LAW BY WADE 
AND PHILLIPS
Wade and P h illip s  therefore found it n ecessa ry  to re s ta te  
the ru le  of law . They reduced the  p rin c ip le  contra  a rb i­
tra ry  pow ers to the ru le  “that, so  fa r as  p u n ish m en t for 
offences is concerned, the c itizen  can  foresee the conse­
quences of h is  conduct and w ill no t be p un ished  save for a 
b reach  of the o rd in a ry  law. He w ill, m oreover, be tried  in  
the o rd in ary  co u rts .” 10) The p rin c ip le  w hich po rtrayed  
D icey’s d is tru s t of delegated  leg is la tiv e  pow ers w as 
refo rm ulated  by Wade and  P h illip s  to read  “th a t pow ers 
should be defined by law  and th a t any  abuse of pow er or 
o ther w rongful act by pub lic  o fficers shou ld  be sub ject to 
contro l by the cou rts  in  the  sam e w ay as any  w rongfu l act 
com m itted  by a p riv a te  c itizen .” 11) F ina lly , Wade and 
P h illip s  rep h rased  D icey’s th ird  p rin c ip le  as follows: 
“The citizen  w hose fu n dam en ta l r ig h ts  are  in fringed  m ay 
seek  h is  rem edy  in  the co u rts  and w ill re ly , no t upon a 
co n stitu tio n a l g uaran tee , bu t on the o rd in a ry  law  of the 
land .” 12)
Wade and P h illip s ’ re s ta tem e n t of the  ru le  of law  also  
im plies  a s ig n ifican t change  reg a rd in g  the  v e ry  n a tu re  of 
th a t concept. W hereas D icey p ro fessed  th a t the ru le  of law  
sim p ly  reflected  the basic  p rin c ip le s  of E n g lish  law  as an 
em p irica l system , Wade and P h illip s  tran sfo rm ed  the 
ru le  of law  in to  a S o lle n sp r in z ip  of w hat the law  ough t to 
be. The ru le  of law  w as no lo n g e r to be “a fixed p rin c ip le  of 
law ,” but becam e “a guide to conduct by any  p o litica l 
p a rty  w hich  is  in  a po sitio n  to  in fluence the course  of 
le g is la tio n .” 13)
A s such  the  ru le  of law  w as in te rp re ted  by Wade and 
P h illip s  to m ean  “th a t the  ex erc ise  of pow ers of g o v ern ­
m en t sh a ll be conditioned  by law  and th a t the sub ject 
sh a ll bot be exposed to the  a rb itra ry  w ill of h is  ru le r .” 14) 
T hat im p lie s  “the absence of a rb itra ry  pow er; effective 
con tro l of and p ro p er p u b lic ity  fo r delegated  leg isla tion , 
p a r tic u la r ly  w hen it im poses p enalties; th a t w hen d isc re ­
tio n a ry  pow er is  g ran ted  the  m a n n e r in  w hich  it  is  to be 
exerc ised  should  as far as is  p rac ticab le  be defined; th a t 
every  m an  should  be re sp o n sib le  to the o rd in a ry  law
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whether he be private citizen or public officer; that pri­
vate rights should be determined by impartial and inde­
pendent tribunals; and that fundamental private rights 
are safeguarded by the ordinary law  of the land.”15)
By transferring the rule of law to the sphere of legal ideas 
Wade and Phillips obviated the critique founded on 
D icey’s prem ise that the rule of law reflected basic princi­
ples of em pirical E nglish law. But, then, it is  equally true 
that Wade and Phillips have abandoned the original 
m eaning of the rule of law.
OTHER STANDARD INTERPRETATIONS OF THE 
RULE OF LAW
Alm ost every text-book dealing with British constitu­
tional law contains an attempt to im prove on D icey’s con­
cept of the rule of law. Suffice it for present purposes to 
refer to only a few of these attempts.
Sir Ivor Jennings shared the view  with Wade and Phillips  
that the principles which Dicey found to be inherent in the 
concept of the rule of law did not, in fact, reflect the p osi­
tive law of England as an em pirical system . He cham ­
pioned the idea that the rule of law  should be rephrased to 
designate a democratic form of governm ent as against a 
dictatorship. In that sense it would come to mean “that 
political power rests in the last analysis on free elections, 
carried out in a State where criticism  of the Government 
is  not only perm issible but a positive merit, and where 
parties based on com peting policies or interests are not 
only allowed but encouraged.”16) In such a system , he 
said, the principles which are usually  associated with the 
rule of law w ill follow automatically; i e  separation of 
powers, equality of all before the law “irrespective of 
race, religion, colour, social importance, or w ealth” and 
the impartial application of the law to all “citizens,” and a 
freedom which, according to Jennings, can be felt rather 
than analysed and which excludes, am ongst others, the 
use of “unconscionable m eans” for acquiring evidence, 
espionage, unnecessary restrictions of freedom of m ove­
ment and of speech and especially  of thought.17) The 
status of the opposition, said Jennings, indicates whether 
a country is  really free.18)
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A ccording to Hood P h illip s the rule of law is  significant 
in three respects: firstly , it influences the leg islator (as 
S o llen sprin zip  for legislation); secondly, it provides a 
rule of interpretation in the sense that all statutory law  
m ust be interpreted in such a w ay that freedom of the 
subject (especia lly  freedom of the person) is  left intact as 
far as possible; thirdly, it contains a rule of evidence in  
that a ll are to be regarded as equals before the law  and 
that any person who professes a special right, power, pri­
v ilege  or im m unity m ust prove h is c la im .19)
Then there are also those writers who kept to the original 
m eaning of the rule of law  in the sense of “suprem acy of 
law .”20) That m eaning of the term w as said21) to have ori­
ginated in Bracton’s dictum: “Ipse autem rex, non debet 
esse  sub homine, sed sub deo et sub lege, quia lex  facit 
regem .”22) Some writers even trace the history of the con­
cept of suprem acy of the law back to A ristotle, who re­
marked: “The rule of law then . . .  is  preferable to the rule 
of an individual citizen .”23) R idges24) discovered a close  
relationship between “rule of law ” in that sense and the 
very fam ous section 29 of the Magna Charta;25) and in  
view  of this original m eaning of “rule of law ” he remar­
ked: “The idea that all governm ental powers rest on law  
lies  at the basis of the Constitution.”26)
A variation on the sam e theme is  to be found in the very  
interesting exposition  of the concept of rule of law by an 
Am erican author, A L Goodhart.27) He first rejects the 
identification of the rule of law with a democratic form of 
governm ent and with “the idea of basic rights.” “. . .  the 
rule of law ,” he says, “is  the m achinery by which effect 
can be g iven  to such basic rights as are recognized in any 
particular legal system .”28) The rule of law  in that sense  
is  constituted by m eans of “the control which is  exercised  
over the public officers of the State by m eans of law .”29) 
Briefly the rule of law is “a rule which controls the public 
officers of the State”30) and as such the rule of law  does not 
mean “rule b y  law" but “rule under the law."31) For that 
reason Goodhart prefers to use the expression  “govern­
ment under law ” rather than “rule of law .”32)
This clever p lay upon words has more to it than first 
m eets the eye. Goodhart’s formula, like that of A ristotle  
quoted above from The P o litics, accentuates the m eaning  
of “rule” in the sense of “govern.” Goodhart rightly poin­
ted out that if “rule of law ” were to be identified with “rule
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by law ”, then  to ta lita r ia n  states, w hich  re s tr ic t freedom  
in  a rad ical sense w ith  the aid of fa r-reach in g  law s, can  
also  claim  th a t they  uphold the ru le  of law . “R ule under 
the law ,” how ever, im plies  th a t the s ta te  au tho rity , inc lu ­
d ing  the executive, leg is la tiv e  and ju d ic ia l b ranches of 
governm ent, is  to govern  sub ject to the law. F or the effec­
tive function ing  of the ru le  of law  in th a t sense G oodhart 
form ulated  th ree  essen tia ls : p rov is io n  m u st be m ade for 
suffic ien t p rocesses for enforcing  the rule; s ta te  officials 
m ust adm it th a t they are  subject to the law; and the 
society as a whole m ust rea lise  th a t the im plem en tation  
of the ru le  of law  depends upon the  w ill of every  ind i­
vidual.
The sam e idea finds exp ress ion  in  the  G erm an te rm  for 
“ru le  of law ”, i e R ech tssta a tsp rin zip . Theodor M aunz 
described a law -state  as “ein  S ta a t . .. der die F orderung  
nach fo rm eller G esetz lichkeit in m ó g lich s te r Vollen- 
dung (P erfektionierung) v erw irk lich t;” and he a ttribu ted  
the fo llow ing  ch a ra c te ris tic s  to such a state: “das P rinz ip  
der G ese tzm ássigkeit der E xekutive, die rich te rlich e  
K ontrolle der G ese tzm ássigkeit in V erbindung m it rich- 
te rlich e r U nabhángigkeit und w eitestgehender Rechts- 
w eggaran tie , der V orrang  und der V orbehalt des form- 
lichen  G esetzes, die V oraussehbarkeit und B erechenbar- 
ke it der s taa tlich en  M assnam en und die au s  alledem  her- 
vorgehende R ech tssicherhe it.”33) R ech tss ta a tsp r in z ip  
therefore g ives ex p ress io n  to  the idea th a t s ta te  au th o rity  
is  subord inate  to the law  and th a t governm en t is  to be p e r­
form ed sub ject to legal ru les.
THE RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Since the Second World War (1939 - 1945) the concept of 
ru le  of law  h as  undergone changes w hich  affect both its  
s ign ificance and m eaning . F irs tly , the  idea of a ru le  of 
law  has  been in te rn a tio n a lised  to becom e “a m a tte r  of 
u n iv e rsa l d iscussion  and endeavour to fo rm ulate  the 
basic  elem ents of the ru le ”.34) Secondly, the ru le  of law  
cam e to be identified w ith the doctrine of hum an  righ ts.
Both of these  changes w ere s tim u la ted  by the U niversa l 
D eclaration o f H um an R ig h ts  w hich  w as fo rm ulated  
under the ausp ices of the United N ations O rg an isa tio n  in  
1948. M ention of “the ru le  of la w ” in the p ream ble  of the 
D eclaration  ensu red  the w orld-w ide p rom inence of th a t
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concept. A t the sam e tim e the D eclaration  constructed  a 
link  betw een the ru le  of law  and the doctrine of hum an 
rig h ts  by a sse rtin g  “th a t hum an  rig h ts  should  be p ro tec­
ted by the ru le  of law .” The concept of “ru le  of law ” w as 
soon adopted by the In terna tiona l C om m ission  o f Ju r is ts  
to serve  as a co llective te rm  for all those legal p rinc ip les  
w hich  the C om m ission reg a rd s  as e ssen tia ls  for the 
im plem en ta tion  of the doctrine of hum an  rig h ts . In my 
opin ion  the I C J is la rge ly  responsib le  for the fa irly  gene­
ra l accep tance of the in terpo la ted  m ean ing  of "ru le  of 
law ” as a p re req u is ite  for the p ro tec tion  of hum an righ ts.
In v;ew  of th is  in terpo la ted  m ean ing  of the ru le  of law 
Wade and P h illip s  stated: “The ru le  of law  has  com e to be 
regarded  as the m ark  of a free society  . . . everyw here  it is 
identified  w ith  the liberty  of the in d iv id u a l."15) Yardley 
pu t it as follows: “P rov id ing  the aim  is the p reserv a tio n  
of the liberty  and rig h ts  of a ll m em bers of the com m unity , 
and th a t on ly  such excep tions from  th is  aim  as are e ssen ­
tia l to the ad m in is tra tio n  of the nation  in an  o rderly  fa s­
h ion  . . t he p u rpose  of the ru le  of law  w ill have been fu l­
filled .”36)
The p a r tic u la r  hum an  r ig h ts  w hich have come to be a sso ­
ciated  w ith  the ru le  of law  are, accord ing  to Yardley, 
“freedom  of the person  to behave as he p leases, equality  
before the law, freedom  of p roperty , the r ig h t to free elec­
tion, freedom  of speech and to w rite, freedom  of public 
w orsh ip , freedom  of assem b ly  and associa tion , and 
fam ily  r ig h ts .”37) Wade and  P h illip s  in  tu rn  gave p a r tic u ­
la r  p rom inence in the second p a r t  of th e ir  w ork  on B ritish  
con stitu tio n a l law  to “freedom  of p e rso n  and p ro p e rty ” 
and  “liberty  of d iscu ssio n .”38)
SOUTH AFRICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF THE RULE 
OF LAW
In dea ling  w ith  South  A frican  in te rp re ta tio n s  of the ru le  
of law  I w ill re s tr ic t m yself to gen era litie s . For a m ore 
elaborate  and c ritica l su rv ey  of som e of the  m ost im p o r­
ta n t ex positions of the ru le  of law  by South  A frican  
au tho rs , the read e r can be referred  to the com m endable 
an a ly s is  by F V enter, entitled: The W ithering  o f th e “R u le  
o f Law .”39)
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At the ou tset I would like to s tre ss  tha t South A frican  in ­
te rp re te rs  and c ritics  of the ru le  of law  find them selves in 
a societal s itu a tio n  w hich is  excellen tly  su ited  for expo­
sing  the true  m eaning, relevancy, m erits  and dem erits  of 
tha t concept. O pponents of the South  A frican  rac ia l 
policy  and critics  of its  secu rity  leg isla tion , who a t the 
sam e tim e profess to be d isc ip les of the ru le  of law, have 
chosen to focus the debate regard ing  the pros  and cons  of 
tha t policy  and leg is la tion  on the ru le  of law; and the a t tr i­
butes of a concept such as “ru le  of law ” can in any  case 
best be dem onstrated  w ith reference to s itu a tio n s  in 
w hich it operates  under s tra in . O fficials and su p p o rte rs  
of the South A frican governm ent have often in  the p as t 
reacted by deny ing  the m eaningfu l ex istence or by expo­
s ing  supposed  deficiencies of a ru le  of law. In South 
A frica exponents and opponents of the doctrine of the 
ru le  of law , therefore, find them selves confronted face to 
face w ith  one ano ther in  a lively  debate focussed on con­
crete em p irica l p rob lem s of v ita l im portance. One would 
at least expect th a t th is  debate w ill d isclose every  angle 
of the u n ru ly  horse.
A cross-sec tion  of the South A frican  in te rp re te rs  of the 
ru le  of law  are of the old school, rev e rtin g  to the D icinian 
p a rap h rase . But understandab ly , they too w ere 
com pelled to in terpolate , because in its  o rig in a l form  the 
“ru le  of law ” indicated  a se t of em p irica l ru le s  of spec ifi­
cally  E ng lish  constitu tiona l law; and as such  the ru le  of 
law  could hard ly  have any  m ean ingfu l re levancy  for p u r­
poses of the South A frican law. South A frican  w rite rs  
therefore in v a riab ly  regard  the ru le  of law  as  a u n iv e rsa l 
p rin c ip le  w hich operates in the realm  of the legal idea, i e 
as a p rin c ip le  founded on eth ics and ap p ly in g  to a ll legal 
sy stem s w ith  reference to w hat (the basic  function  of) the 
law  ough t to be. But, a lthough  the tran sfo rm atio n  of the 
ru le  of law  from  an E ng lish  legal concept in to  a u n iv e rsa l 
legal idea is rad ica l in its  natu re . South A frican  in te rp re ­
ters, gen era lly  speak ing , endeavour to keep to the D ici­
n ian  con ten ts of the term .
In th is  sense B einart4U) d is tin g u ish es  betw een the “cen ­
tra l m ean in g ” and a “secondary  sense" of the ru le  of law, 
the cen tra l m ean ing  being “tha t the law  ru les  or is 
suprem e in every  society — le x  suprem a  est — th a t is, 
th a t a ll ru les  or pow ers m ust derive from  duly enacted or 
estab lished  law ,”41) and the secondary  sense  being “th a t
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th e  legal sy stem  should  be o rgan ised  on a b as is  of de­
ta iled  p redeterm ined  ru le s .”42) In the la tte r  sense, w hich 
B einart describes as the “true  sense ,”43) the ru le  of law  
am oun ts to the p rin c ip le  of le g a lity  as a g a in s t “the ru le  of 
discretion  in w hich the  r ig h ts  of p erso n s  are  determ ined 
by o th e rs  ex e rc is in g  a law ful d iscre tion  but w ithou t re ­
ference to detailed lega l ru le s  .. ,”44)
S im ila rly  D onald M olteno45) postu la tes , w ith  reg ard  to 
the  ru le  of law , “th a t it invo lves genera l ru les , as opposed 
to a rb itra ry  d iscretion ; th a t such  ru les  av a il ag a in st the 
S tate  itse lf;” and adds “th a t th e ir  ad m in is tra tio n  is en ­
tru s ted  to an independent and im p a rtia l ju d ic ia ry .”46)
S ch re iner eq u a lly  adheres to a “fo rm al” m ean ing  of the 
ru le  of law. In coun tries  w here pub lic  o rder ex ists, he 
says, the ru le  of law  re la te s  to “the  con tro l by the law, i e, 
the ru les  o r p recep ts  recogn ised  by the courts, over the 
actions of the execu tive and the le g is la tu re  in  th e ir  d ea l­
ings w ith  the in d iv id u a l.”47) E lsew here he quo tes an e a r­
lie r sta tem en t m ade by h im se lf in w hich he defined the 
ru le  of law  in the follow ing term s: “The Rule of Law 
m eans the law  should  rule; in  o ther w ords, th a t the life, 
liberty , p roperty , freedom  of speech and m ovem ent of the 
ind iv idual should  not be endangered  or res tric ted  by state  
action  save in accordance w ith  a genera l p recep t ap p li­
cable to all pe rso n s in c ircu m stan ces  set out in the law, 
the ap p licab ility  of the g enera l p recep t to a p ra tic u la r  
person  being decided by a co u rt of law ."4")
F inally , A S M athew s also  com m its h im se lf to the p rin ­
cip le  of lega lity  as “an e ssen tia l e lem ent in  a ll defin itions 
of the Rule of Law excep t the fo rm alis tic  one .. .”4B) The 
p rin c ip le  of legality , w hich M athew s finds to be “im plic it 
ra th e r  th an  exp lic it in D icey 's doctrine of the Rule of 
Law ,”50) ex p resses  the idea of “governm en t accord ing  to 
law"-'1) and p resu p p o ses  the law  to be a rég im e of know n 
and certa in  ru le s .”52) In an  e a rlie r  pub lica tion  M athew s 
described th is  “g rea t p rin c ip le  . . .  fundam ental to Dicey 's 
doctrine" as one w hich p o s tu la te s  “th a t ru le r  and subject 
a like  sh a ll be under law .“53)
The com m on featu re of a ll the defin itions so fa r is tha t 
they reduce the ru le  of law  to its  m ost lite ra l and funda­
m en tal m ean ing  of legality , w hich im plies, briefly , tha t 
both ru le r  and sub ject of a s ta te  are governed  by the law. 
In th is  form al sen se  the ru le  of law  re la tes , as B einart
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pu ts  it, to “the m echanics o r s tru c tu re  of the legal system  
and not to the substance o r content of its  v ario u s  
law s.”54) A s such it poses a serious problem  to those 
exponents of the concept who cham pion  the ru le  of law  as 
the bulw ark  of libera l ideals. The problem  is th a t the m ost 
despotic and abso lu tis t s ta tes  can be constitu ted  in  such a 
w ay th a t the law  can be said  to govern  the ru le r  and the 
subject, and the ru le  of law  in  the form al sense of legality  
can p rev a il by ac tua lly  au th o ris in g  rad ica l in roads into 
the rig h ts  and freedom s of the subjects. In a word, the ru le  
of law  in the form al sense of legality  does not guaran tee 
ju stice  o r the p ro tection  of hum an rig h ts  and c iv il liber­
ties.
For th is  reason  South A frican  au thors in v a riab ly  endea­
v ou r to read substance into the ru le  of law  — often con­
tra ry  to th e ir  own in itia l p rem ises in  th is  regard. For in ­
stance, B einart reg ard s  a ttem pts to co nstruc t the ru le  of 
law  “itse lf to cover also  the sub stan tiv e  content of the 
legal sy stem ” as “ne ither ju s tifiab le  no r n ecessary ,” but 
then im m ediately  proceeds “to give body to the Rule of 
Law;”55) and in so doing he fo rm ulates “m in im um  s ta n ­
dards of ju s tice”56) w hich I find d ifficult to d is tin g u ish  
from  “the su bstan tive  conten t of the legal sy stem ” and 
w hich he h im self even tually  describes as “a num ber of 
p rin c ip les  . . .  w hich can and have been g iven expression  
and form ulation  in legal te rm s in the com m on law, in s ta ­
tu tes  or in co n stitu tio n s.”57) It is on the w hole quite 
obvious tha t B einart regards, am ongst o thers, the p ro tec­
tion  of hum an  rig h ts  to be the concern  of the ru le  of law, 
or, as he h im self pu t it, tha t “the p rin c ip les  of the Rule of 
Law lean in  favour of the ind iv idual, and serve ind iv idual 
r ig h ts ;”58) th a t “the Rule of Law can be said  to function 
best in a free society, and to be closely  associated  w ith  the 
rig h ts  of the ind iv idual;59) o r th a t “the Rule of Law is an 
ind ispensab le  req u irem en t for the p reserv a tio n  of c iv il 
lib e rty .”60)
In g iv ing  substance to the ru le  of law  M olteno s im ila rly  
concludes tha t "the ru le  of law  is concerned w ith  the p ro ­
tection of ind ividua l legal r ig h ts  and lib e rtie s” and tha t 
“the r ig h ts  and liberties  in question  are enforceable 
against, and protected by, the S tate .”61) M olteno derives 
th is  substan tive  m ean ing  of the ru le  of law  w hich con­
cerns hum an rig h ts  from  D icey 's th ird  p roposition ,62) 
thereby obviously  read ing  m ore into it than  Dicey h im ­
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self intended. D icey’s concern  w as s im ply  for the 
com m on law  pro tec tion  of r ig h ts  as a g a in s t c o n s titu ­
tio n a l en tren ch m en ts  and he ce rta in ly  did not m ean to 
convey h is  sy m p ath y  for the  doctrine  of hum an  rig h ts  
w hen he fo rm ulated  any  of th e  p rin c ip le s  in h e ren t in the 
ru le  of law . M olteno’s suggestion , th a t “D icey’s concep­
tion  of the R ule of Law s till ho lds the field  as the essen tia l 
sa feg u ard  of p e rso n a l liberty , in c lu d in g  the c la ss ic  lib e r­
tie s  and r ig h ts  associa ted  therew ith , such  as those of 
exp ression , re lig ion , assoc ia tion , peacefu l assem bly , and 
so fo rth ,” therefore, in  m y opin ion , re s ts  on a m isconcep­
tion  of D icey’s c lea r in ten tion .
M athew s a lso  poses the questio n  w hether “the ru le  of law  
be the ru le  of any  law  or on ly  law  w hich conform s to c e r­
ta in  s tan d ard s  derived from  d isc ip lin es  ou tside the 
la w ? ”63) In answ er to h is  q u estio n  he a ssu m es  a “c lea r 
belief” on the p a r t of Dicey “th a t the law  g o v ern in g  the 
re la tio n  of the sub ject to the  S ta te  shou ld  reflec t ce rta in  
lib e ra l v a lu es  to w hich  he (Dicey) subscribed ;”64) and in 
g iv in g  su b stan ce  to th is  a ssu m p tio n  in h is  th e sis  on Law, 
O rder and L ib er ty  in S o u th  A fr ica  he, am o n g st o thers, 
“boldly  identifies the R ule of Law w ith  the  p ro tec tion  of 
ce rta in  basic  freedom s”66) — su rp r is in g ly  so, since  he at 
the sam e tim e em p h a tica lly  re jec ts  as unsc ien tific  “the 
iden tifica tion  of hum an  rig h ts  or of a p a r tic u la r  p h ilo ­
sophy  (as in  n a tu ra l law ) w ith  the  R ule of Law .”66)
Let m e also  re fer to an  A frik aan s  exponen t of the ru le  of 
law , A J G M S anders ,67) who steered  c lea r of the p rin c ip le  
of leg a lity  by ta k in g  a sh o rt cu t to the doctrine of hum an 
rig h ts , the reby  avo id ing  the  fundam en ta l m ean in g  of 
“ru le  of law ” in  o rder to ob lige the  I C J ’s conception of the 
ru le  of law . S anders  defines the  ru le  of law  as  follows: 
“The ru le  of law  is th a t leg a l-p o litica l code of conduct 
ap p ly in g  to s ta te  au th o rity  w hich  in  a g iven  tim e is  best 
su ited  to secu re  to the ind iv id u al th e  m ax im um  p leasu re  
and to g u aran tee  those  r ig h ts  of a c itizen  w hich, in  view  of 
the e x is tin g  c ircu m stan ces  of the p o litic a l society  con­
cerned, a re  regarded  as fundam ental, ta k in g  the  equal 
r ig h ts  of o th e r m em bers of the  society  and the ju s tified  
c la im s of s ta te  au th o rity  in to  co n sid era tio n .”68) A ccor­
d ing  to S an d ers’ v is io n  the m ain  function  of the ru le  of 
law  is supposed  to be to su p p o rt the  im plem en ta tion  of 
hum an  rights?") H is p o s itiv is tic  p o in t of d ep a rtu re ,70) 
to g e th er w ith  h is  su p p o sitio n  th a t the ru le  of law  is  to be 
regarded  as  “a leg a l-p o litica l code of conduct,”71) p laces
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the ju rid ica l na tu re  of the ru le  of law  in  issue, because 
p o s itiv ism  p resu p p o ses  th a t p o sitive  law  is the only  
ju rid ica l rea lity .
This problem  reg a rd in g  the ju rid ica l n a tu re  of the ru le  of 
law  is a lso  am ong M athew s’ p reoccupations. In p ro ­
v id ing  the ru le  of law  w ith  m a te ria l substance he advo­
cates “the subjection  ofJthatpart of the law  w hich governs 
the re la tio n sh ip  of the citizen  to the S ta te  to m ora l sc ru ­
tin y ."7*) The ru le  of law, he says, “is the app lica tio n  of ce r­
ta in  m oral judgm en ts  to a defined b ranch  of the  law  and a 
study of the techn iques and devices w hereby  the v a lues  
in heren t in these judgem en ts m ay be achieved th rough  
law .”7J) This is, to say  the least, ca re less  p h ra s in g  w hich 
sug g ests  tha t the ru le  of law  is a so rt of sc ien tific  tech ­
nique. But be tha t as it m ay, M athew s p o stu la tes  th a t the 
ru le  of law  “is, or ought to be, ju rid ica l in its  ch a ra c te r,”74) 
but it is not a t a ll c lear how he in tends to m a in ta in  the 
ju rid ica l ch a ra c te r of the ru le  of law  w hile  its  function  is 
to subject a d iv ision  of the law  to m ora l scru tiny .
The tru th  is th a t the lega l idea, w hich m ay be found to 
include the ru le  of law. is  n ece ssa rily  ju rid ica l in  its 
n a tu re  even though it an tic ip a tes  e th ica l p rin c ip les . To 
pu t it in  ano ther way: e th ical no rm s can  only  serve as 
lega l ideas after they  have been rep h rased  in  the form  of 
ju rid ica l p rinc ip les , th a t is  p rin c ip les  capab le of being 
transfo rm ed  into ju rid ica l ru les . A s long  as  the ru le  of 
law  rem a in s  orien ted  to the ju rid ica l m ean ing -kernel it 
w ill n ece ssa rily  be ju rid ica l in  charac ter.
In m y view  the ru le  of law  in  its  h is to rica l and lite ra l 
sense  sim p ly  m eans lega lity , w hich  m eans, as  M arinus 
W iechers p u ts  it, “th a t an  act, o r in  a b roader sense, an  
action, m u st be perform ed in  accordance w ith  the  law .”75) 
In connection w ith  the ru le  of law  le g a lity  re fe rs  to the 
acts and ac tions of both the ru le rs  and  the  sub jects  of a 
state. But it m eans n o th in g  m ore. W iechers po in ted  out 
th a t a ttem p ts  to identify  th e  ru le  of law  w ith  dem ocratic  
o r lib e ra l p o litica l theo ries  do no t take  the req u irem en ts  
of the m odern w elfare s ta te s  into accoun t76) and  th a t such  
a ttem p ts  m ake it even m ore d ifficu lt to determ ine the ju ­
rid ica l m ean in g  of th a t concept.77) But the re  is m ore to it 
th an  ju s t that. A ttem pts to condense a ll lib e ra l po litica l 
ideals into a s in g le  concept ind icated  by the term  “ru le  of 
law " have only  led to confusion  and d iv e rs itie s  of op in ion
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and have clothed the ru le  of law  w ith  such vag u en ess  of 
m ean ing  th a t one m ay very  w ell doubt the m ean ingfu l 
re levancy  of such  a term . S ch re ine r r ig h tly  rem arked: “If 
th a t concept (i e ‘ru le  of law ’) is  not su fficien t to achieve 
the good life, by all m eans p u t fo rw ard  new p roposa ls , but 
do not, I suggest, use the old nam e as  if i t  h as  im p ercep ti­
bly acqu ired  a w holly  new m ean in g .”78)
The need felt by som e w rite rs  to clo the the ru le  of law  w ith  
a lib e ra l substance w as in  all p robab ility  based  on a false 
(non-existent) problem . It w as, I im agine, the belief of 
those  in te rp re te rs  th a t if the ru le  of law  w ere to m ean s im ­
ply  legality , le g is la to rs  w ould be at la rge  to o rdain  des­
po tism  and in justice  w ith in  the fram ew ork  of the ru le  of 
law . In  a sense th a t is true, bu t it m u st a lso  be borne in 
m ind th a t leg is la tiv e  so vere ign ty  does not am oun t to an 
om nipo ten t law -m aking  com petency. The law giver 
derives lega l ru les  from  ju rid ica l p rinc ip les . Some of 
those  p rin c ip les  have a co n stitu tiv e  and  o thers  have a 
reg u la tiv e  function w ith  reg a rd  to p o sitive  law; th a t is, 
p o sitive  law  is based on constitu tiv e  ju rid ic a l p rin c ip les  
as a m a tte r  of necessity , w hile reg u la tiv e  ju rid ica l p r in ­
cip les m erely  serve as a S o llen p rin z ip  of w hat the law  
ough t to be.
It is  sufficient, for p resen t p u rposes, to quote a sing le  
exam ple  to illu s tra te  the point. Section 2 of the  R epub lic  
o f Sou th  A frica  C onstitu tion  A c t, 1961,79) w hich  reads: 
“The people of the  R epublic of South A frica acknow ledge 
th e  sovereign ty  and gu idance of A lm igh ty  God,” is  
obv iously  not a lega l norm , th e  reaso n  be ing  th a t th is  fo r­
m u la  lack s  an e ssen tia l co n stitu tiv e  ju rid ica l p rincip le , 
i e the  ju rid ica l m ean ing -kernel of re trib u tio n . In  form  
and ch a ra c te r  section  2 of the C onstitu tion  co n ta in s  a  con­
fession  of fa ith  and the m ere fact th a t it w as enacted in  a 
p a rliam e n ta ry  s ta tu te  can n o t tra n s fig u re  it in to  a legal 
norm .
Ju rid ic a l p rin c ip les  w hich  an tic ip a te  e th ica l no rm s 
app ly  as  reg u la tiv e  ideas of w hat the  law  ough t to be. 
T here is  no need to inco rpo ra te  those p rin c ip le s  in to  one’s 
concept of the ru le  of law; and in  not do ing  so one does not 
d is tra c t one inch  from  th e ir  v a lid ity  as  n o rm ativ e  re g u la ­
tive p rin c ip les . Those reg u la tiv e  p rin c ip le s  w ith  an  e th i­
cal foundation, and not the p rin c ip le  of lega lity , se rve  as 
»n ideal w hich law g iv ers  shou ld  endeavour to inco r­
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porate  in to  p ositive  law  and as a c rite rio n  for the e v a lu a ­
tion  of th e  m erits  and  dem erits  of a  lega l system . But of 
course, if one reg a rd s  the p rin c ip le  of le g a lity  a s  a  ju r i­
d ical p rin c ip le  w ith  an  e th ica l foundation, th en  the ru le  of 
law  m u st be seen  as one of the  reg u la tiv e  ju rid ic a l p r in ­
cip les w ith  w hich  the  law  o uh t to com ply.
CALVINISM AND THE RULE OF LAW
In h is  a rtic le  on The W ithering  o f the "R u le  o f L a w ” 
F V enter p o in ts  out th a t those in te rp re te rs  of the ru le  of 
law  w ho identify  th a t concept w ith  the doctrine  of hum an  
rig h ts  base th e ir  a rg u m en ts  on a  h u m a n is tic  p o in t of 
d ep artu re  w hich  is  d irec tly  opposed to the th eo cen trica l 
app roach  to o u r p roblem  p re sen t in  C alv in ism .80) I t m ust, 
how ever, be s tre ssed  th a t C alv in ism  does no t deny the 
ex istence o r  re lev an cy  of a  ru le  of law  in  the  sen se  of le g a ­
lity , o r of p a rticu la rly  p rec ious hum an  rig h ts  bu t rebels 
ag a in s t hu m an is tic  endeavours to m ake m an  o r h um an  
reason  the  m easu re  and sole considera tion  of such  a ru le  
o r such  righ ts.
The an th ropocen tric  app ro ach  of hu m an ism  introduces, 
in  the p resen t context, a  h ig h ly  sub jective  e lem ent in to  
the  concept of ru le  of law, cau s in g  the con ten t of the  ru le  
of law  to v a ry  and sw ay accord ing  to  the  w h im s and fan ­
cies of its  in te rp re te rs . This, accord ing  to  M athew s, is  no 
crim e and is, on the  co n tra ry , a s ine  qua non  fo r „any u se ­
ful conception of the ru le  of law .”81) It is, of course, true  
th a t every  in te rp re ta tio n  ca rr ie s  w ith  it a sub jective  ele­
m ent, bu t M athew s w as here  concerned w ith  m ore th an  
the  m ere ly  p e rso n a l p re jud ices  w hich  in fluence one’s 
v is io n  of rea lity . The “sub jective  n o tio n s” of w h ich  he 
speaks  in  the p resen t reg ard  concern  h is  sub jec tiv istic  
conviction  th a t m o ra l judgm en ts  have no fixed and  cer­
ta in  b as is  but re s t w holly  on one’s p e rso n a l and  sub jec­
tive  p red ilections.
C alv in ism , on the o ther hand, w ith  h is to ric  C h ris tian ity , 
m a in ta in s  th a t e th ica l norm s, like all o th e r k in d s of 
no rm s as  w ell as all n a tu ra l law s w hich  reg u la te  the  cos­
m ic order, do h av e  a  fixed foundation. A lthough  one’s 
v iew  of those  no rm s and law s w ill a lw ay s p o rtra y  one’s 
ind iv idual sub jectiv ity , th e ir  e ssen tia l s tru c tu re s  a re  
rooted in  crea tion  itse lf as revea led  in  the H oly S crip tu re  
and  w ill a lw ays rem a in  constan t. This ap p lie s  bo th  to the 
constitu tiv e  ju rid ica l p rin c ip les , w hich  find ex p ress io n
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in  p o s itiv e  law , and the  reg u la tiv e  ju rid ica l p rin c ip les , 
w h ich  a re  destined to d irec t the  w ay  to ideal law s. In so far 
a s  th o se  p rin c ip les  a re  founded on the  n o rm ativ e  side of 
rea lity , th e ir  con ten ts can  and  shou ld  v a ry  accord ing  to 
th e  v a ry in g  dem ands of the re le v an t tim e, p lace  and c ir­
cu m stances , bu t the in v a ria b ility  of th e ir  ch a ra c te ris tic  
s tru c tu re s  se ts  defin ite  lim its  to flu c tu a tio n s  of th e ir 
m ean in g  and con ten ts. C alv in ism  can  therefo re  never 
subsc ribe  to the view  th a t a so v ere ig n  la w g iv er w ho does 
no t upho ld  the ru le  of law  is free to le g is la te  as and w h at­
ever he p leases. To be v a lid  law s, the ex p ress io n s  of a 
desp o t’s w ill m u st b ear ev idence of the s tru c tu re  of the 
law  as such  and of the co n stitu tiv e  ju rid ica l p rin c ip les  
w hich  underlie  every  ju rid ica l norm , and the reg u la tiv e  
p rin c ip le s  w ith th e ir  e th ica l foundation  w ill a lw ays 
rem ain  operative  as the la w g iv e r’s conscience.
Looked at from  an o th e r angle, it am ounts to the follow ­
ing: C alv in ism  does not re ly  on the  ru le  of law  to safe­
gu ard  the rea lisa tio n  of p rin c ip les  w ith  an e th ical 
foundation  in po sitiv e  law. Those p rin c ip les  app ly  as 
reg u la tiv e  ju rid ica l p rin c ip le s  of w hat the law  ough t to 
be, irre sp ec tiv e  of w hether the la w g iv er and governm ent 
reg a rd  them selves  as  above the  law  or, on the o th e r hand, 
as su b o rd in a tes  of the law . And, w hereas hum an ism  
bases its  p references for w hat the law  ou g h t to  be on the 
re la tiv e ly  a rb itra ry  n o tions of its  ex ponen ts  reg ard in g  
th e  flex ib le  needs of m an , C alv in ism  derives  the legal 
idea from  reg u la tiv e  p rin c ip le s  fixed upon the  s tru c tu re  
of c rea tio n  and  to be d iscovered  in the  in v a riab le  Word of 
God.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The ru le  of law  s im p ly  m ean s lega lity , th a t is  th a t both 
the  governm en t and the su b o rd in a tes  ol a statu  are  su b ­
jec t to the  law. The p rin c ip le  of leg a lity  as  such  does not 
n ece ssa rily  p reclude u n ju s t law s, and a  law g iv er w ith  
re la tiv e ly  a rb itra ry  pow ers w ill no t n ecessa rily  a lw ays 
p ro c la im  u n ju s t law s. The ru le  of law , therefore, does not 
se rv e  a s  a g u a ran tee  for lib e rta ria n  law s. N or need one 
in te rp o la te  the  ru le  of law  to  cope w ith  in ju stice , because 
o th e r ju rid ic a l fig u res , nam ely  reg u la tiv e  ju rid ic a l 
p rin c ip les , se rv e  the  pu rpose. A ttem p ts  to in c rease  the 
am bit of the  ru le  of law , so a s  to p rocla im  it to be the 
co rn ers to n e  of ind iv id u al r ig h ts  and c iv il liberties, have 
only  led to confusion  and should  be abandoned.
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The subjection  of subord inates  of s ta te  au th o rity  to the 
law  poses no problem  in  the p resen t context. The m ain  
concern of the ru le  of law  h a s  a lw ays been for the sub jec­
tion of s ta te  au th o rity  to the law. In conclusion  I w ish  to 
indicate a few of the m ore im po rtan t im p lica tio n s  of the 
ru le  of law  in  th is  regard .
S tate au th o rity  w hich  ough t to operate  sub ject to the  law  
includes a ll the  b ranches of governm ent, i e the  le g is la ­
tive, execu tive and ju d ic ia l power.
Subjection of the leg is la tiv e  departm en t of governm ent 
to the law  im plies th a t le g is la tio n  ough t to be perform ed 
in  accordance w ith  lega l ru les , th a t a ttem pted  le g is la tio n  
w hich does not com ply w ith  the  p rocedure for le g is la tio n  
as p rescribed  by law  ought to be reg ard ed  as pro  non  
scrip to , and th a t the law  ough t to p rov ide for a  jud ic ia l 
body w ith  com petency to en q u ire  into the p rocedures 
follow ed by the leg is la tiv e  o rg an  and to declare such  acts 
of the leg is la tu re  w hich do not com ply  w ith  the  p re ­
scribed fo rm alities  to be void.
Subjection of the execu tive d epartm en t of governm en t to 
the law  in  its  s tr ic t sense excludes d isc re tio n ary  pow ers 
of the executive. It can, how ever, be tak en  for g ran ted  tha t 
it w ould not be exped ien t in  m odern s ta te s  to elim inate  
the d isc re tio n s  of executive officials, and there  is  m uch to 
be sa id  for the view  th a t the ru le  of law  should  be m oder­
ated in  th is  reg ard  so as no t to exclude d isc re tio n ary  
pow ers a ltoge ther bu t on ly  to req u ire  such  pow ers to be 
executed w ith in  defin ite and ce rta in  bounds.
Subjection of the jud ic ia l d epartm en t of governm en t to 
the law  im plies th a t cou rts  of law  ough t to ap p ly  the law  
as they find it w ith in  the lim its  se t by the law  for th e ir 
operation . On the o ther hand they  ough t not to be sub jec­
ted to any  o ther lim ita tio n s  th an  those p rescribed  by law  
and ough t to be placed in a position  in w hich they  can 
function  w ithou t b ias and w ithou t fear of in tim idation .
F ina lly  I th in k  it is im p lic it in  the  ru le  of law  th a t the law  
w hich governs both the ru le r  and the sub jects  ough t to be 
c lea rly  understandab le, ough t to app ly  g en era lly  to all 
sub jects or to all sub jects of a g iven  c lass , and ought 
never to operate  re troactively .
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In  th is  sense of leg a lity  the ru le  of law  can  p rovide the 
fram ew ork  for the rea lisa tio n  of e g a lita r ia n  and lib e rta ­
r ian  p rin c ip le s  bu t does not operate  as  a s in e  qua non  for 
the  im plem en ta tion  of such  p rinc ip les . It se rv es  ju s tice  
but does not g u aran tee  it. I t n ev e rth e less  rem a in s  a very  
re le v an t and  usefu l concept, nam ely  one w hich s tre sses  
the  need to define the lim its  of a ll b ranches of g o v ern ­
m en ta l au th o rity  in  c lea r and u nequ ivocal te rm s and 
w hich  is  destined  to re s tr ic t a rb itra ry  pow ers.
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